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STEWART V. ABEND:

DERIVATIVE WORK USERS BEWARE

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is common practice in the movie industry to create a motion picture based on a copyrighted novel.1 This phenomenon occurs legally
when the author of a copyrighted novel assigns the right or gives his
consent to exploit his copyright by creation of a motion picture version
of the novel. 2 The motion picture version is referred to as a derivative
work and may itself be copyrighted,3 while the novel is referred to as the
underlying or preexisting work. This Comment examines a unique
problem related to derivative works and underlying works: the validity
of an author's assignment of exploitation rights for both the original
term and the renewal term of copyright where the author dies prior to
4
the commencement of the renewal term.
The length of copyright for an original work or a derivative work
created before January 1, 1978 is two twenty-eight year terms, referred
to as the original copyright and the renewal copyright, respectively. 5
The two terms were provided to enable an author who had a poor bargaining position during the initial copyright term to renegotiate the exploitation of his work. 6 Thus, both the underlying work and the
derivative work have the right to two terms of copyright. Given the
unique situation of one copyright incorporating another, the remaining
question is whether the rights of one copyright affect the rights of the
other.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this very issue. In Stewart v. Abend, 7 the Court decided that the rights of the derivative work owner to use the underlying work during its renewal term are
1. Motion pictures based on preexisting literary works are a phenomenon as old as
the motion picture medium and have figured importantly throughout film history. SeeJasi,
When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28
UCLA L. REv. 715, 719 n.8 (1981). Classic films such as My FairLady (Warner Brothers
1964), The Sound of Music (Twentieth Century Fox 1965), Gone with the Wind (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1965), and Doctor Zhivago (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1965) were all created by
consensual agreements between the underlying work owner and the movie studio. See
Melniker & Melniker, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copyright Law, 22

N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 589, 612-13 n.118 (1977).
2. An author has the exclusive right to authorize another to publish his copyright,
prepare derivative works based on it, merchandise it, perform it, or display it. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
3. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
4. See also Note, Assignment of Author's Renewal Interest, 18 IND. LJ. 318 (1943); Note,
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. and the Derivative Work Exception to the Termination Right. Inequitable Anomalies Under Copyright Law, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 635 (1979) [hereinafter Note,
Rohauer]; Note, Right of Author to Assign Renewal Rights, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 299 (1943).

5. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988). The initial and renewal term of copyright were first set
out in the 1909 Copyright Act and later preserved in the Copyright Act of 1976. See infra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
7. 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990).
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extinguished when the author of the underlying work dies prior to renewing his copyright. 8 The Court concluded that until the renewal term
commences, the author of an underlying work holds merely an expectancy to assign which is extinguished by his death. His family or statutory successor 9 can take the renewal term free of any prior
assignments.' 0
This decision is significant because it declares that the derivative
work author, who has been assigned the right to produce, distribute,
and copyright a derivative work, may no longer use his derivative work
without infringing upon the underlying renewal copyright. The Abend
Court was sharply divided on this issue and its ruling is likely to have a
significant commercial effect on the relationships of derivative work
owners and underlying work owners.1 This Comment will focus on the
relationship between the renewal copyright owner and the derivative
copyright owner, and on the significance of Abend, and it will attempt to
reconcile the seemingly polar views of the Court.

II.

BACKGROUND

The renewal system and derivative work dichotomy reflect two
deeply rooted policies of American copyright law. 12 The first of these
policies is that an author who copyrights his work should have two
chances at exploiting the work.' 3 The 1909 Copyright Act (1909 Act),
as amended, 14 gave authors and their successors this second chance by
creating two terms of copyright in which each term was treated as a separate estate.1 5 In other words, Congress intended that the author who
assigns exploitation rights during the first (original) copyright term shall
16
have a reversionary interest with respect to the second (renewal) term.
8. Id.
9. In the event the author dies prior to the commencement of the renewal term, the
,.statutory successor" is the party eligible to renew the copyright, which is the author's
surviving spouse, children, executor, or next of kin, respectively. See infra note 31 and
accompanying text.
10. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1759.
11. Prior to Abend, many motion picture companies relied on the holding of Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), which
permitted the use of derivative works during the underlying work's renewal term. See infra
notes 71-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rohauer opinion.
12. Federal copyright law was first adopted in 1790 and later revised in 1831, 1870,
1909, and most recently in 1976.
13. For a general discussion on the policies behind the renewal copyright, see Bricker,
Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 23 (1955); Note, Copyright Renewal
Rights, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 108 (1941).
14. Throughout this Comment, citation to the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35
Star. 1074, will be to the amended version set out in the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61
Stat. 652, unless otherwise indicated. The 1909 Act was superseded by the Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-901 (1988).
15. Courts treat the renewal term given to authors and their successors as an entirely
new estate. This characterization has important implications on the transfer of renewal
interests. See P. GOLDSTEIN, I GOLDSTEIN COPYRIGHT § 4.8.3, at 466 (1989).
16. The House Report on the 1909 Copyright Act observed:
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success ... your committee
felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term,
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The second of these policies is to give independent copyright protection to a derivative work. 17 Congress observed that many artistic developments are procured through use or adaption of previously
copyrighted material.1 8 Where an original work' 9 based on a preexisting copyright is fixed in a tangible form of expression, 20 it is eligible for
21
copyright protection.
Thus, the conflicting rights of two statutory classes come to a head
and present an important and recurring question concerning the meaning and application of the renewal copyright: Does the renewal copyright entitle the author's successor to nullify the derivative work owner's
right to exploit his own independently copyrighted derivative work created with the author's consent? To reconcile these conflicting interests
it is helpful to examine the historical development of the renewal system
and derivative works.
A.

The Statutory Framework

In the 1909 Act, Congress expressed its intent to provide economic
incentive for the creation of artistic works. 2 2 To facilitate this policy,
Congress provided authors or their statutory successors 25 with two
terms of copyright: an initial term of twenty-eight years and, upon
and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
17. A "derivative work" is a work based on one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work".

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
18. See generally M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1978).
19. The standard of originality does not include any requirement of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetics merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) (Notes of
House Committee on the Judiciary, House Report 1476). Originality means that the work
is independently created and not copied from other works. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Card v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) (copyright on greeting cards); 1 M. NiMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 2.01[A].
20. The concept of fixation in a tangible form is important because it represents the
dividing line between common law and statutory protection. An unfixed work of authorship, such as an improvisation or unrecorded performance would continue to be subject to
protection under state common law or statute but not under federal copyright law. See
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 52.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Works of authorship include, but are not limited to, literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures, and sound recordings. Id.
22. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Id. at 219.
23. The copyright clause of the Constitution vests Congress with the powers "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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proper application, a second twenty-eight year renewal term free of any
assignments or licenses made during the preceding twenty-eight year
24
term.
25
The 1909 Act's renewal provisions were based on three grounds.
First, each copyright term should be relatively long. 26 Second, most
works will lose their commercial value and fall into the public domain by
the end of the initial twenty-eight year term unless affirmative steps are
taken to renew the copyright. 27 Third, a work that continues to be commercially valuable after twenty-eight years more likely owes its success
to the creative efforts of the author, rather than the contributions of the
28
derivative work.
Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), the renewal system was
replaced by a termination mechanism. 29 For works existing in their first
copyright term on or before January 1, 1978, however, the 1976 Act
retained the renewal scheme of the 1909 Act, and extended the renewal
term to forty-seven years. 30 Section 304(a) of the 1976 Act provides
that a copyright may be renewed by the work's author if he is alive at the
time the renewal right vests; by the author's surviving spouse or children
if the author is not alive at the time the renewal right vests; by the author's executors if the author and the author's surviving spouse and children are not alive at the time the renewal right vests; and in the absence
of a will, by the author's next of kin.3 '
The time of vesting is critical to the determination of renewal
rights.3 2 For example, where the author assigns his renewal rights but
dies prior to the renewal date, the assignee will take nothing and the
author's family, executor, or next of kin, respectively, will take all. 33
Thus, the 1976 Act generally codified the renewal provisions of the 1909
Act and continued the historical policy of allowing authors a second opportunity to "cash in" on their creative efforts.
34
The origins of the term "derivative work" are somewhat obscure.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (amended 1976). Proper application was secured by filing
an application for renewal within one year of the expiration of the first twenty-eight year

term. Id.

25. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4.8.
26. Id. at § 4.8.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text regarding the termination right.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988). The 1976 Act codified the renewal provisions of the
1909 Act except for extending the renewal term for an additional nineteen years. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (the 1976 Act codified the renewal
provisions of the 1909 Act except for extending the renewal term for an additional
nineteen years).

31. Id. § 304(a).
32. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4.8.1.
33. See 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 9.06[C]; P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
15, § 4.8.1.
34. The term did not appear in the 1909 Act, which stated that "versions of works in
the public domain or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this tide." Copyright
Act of 1909, ch. 391, § 7, 61 Stat. 652 (1947).
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Section 7 of the 1909 Act provided separate and independent copyright
protection for "new works," including a new work that incorporated, to
some extent, one or more copyrighted works.5 5 This section was in effect reenacted in the 1976 Act as section 103, where the term "derivative
work"8 6 was substituted for the "new works" language. s 7 Under section
103, the copyright in a derivative work "extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preex-

isting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material." 3 8 For example, the derivative author
who is licensed to produce a musical opera based on a copyrighted play
to the
is entitled to copyright only that which is original and in 3addition
9
underlying play, and obtains no rights to the play itself.
Under the 1976 Act, in certain circumstances, the author of a copyright may grant a license to exploit his copyright and at a later date terminate the license. 40 The 1976 Act also provides an exemption for the
termination of derivative works. 4 1 Sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A)
provide:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of
the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivathe copyrighted work covered by the
tive works based 4upon
2
terminated grant.
Thus, a motion picture based on a copyrighted novel may continue to be
distributed after termination. Any remakes of the motion picture, however, would constitute infringement. The termination exception of the
1976 Act applies only to copyrights secured afterJanuary 1, 1978. The
Act does not specifically treat the exception's impact on issues raised by
35. The "new work" copyright was limited in two respects. First, it extended only to
new material and not the underlying work. See, e.g., Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales &
Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Adventures in
Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 813 n.3 (7th Cir. 1942); Reyher
v. Children's Television Workshop, 387 F. Supp. 869, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 533
F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). Second, it was limited to the grant
itself. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 849 (1951); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976); Note, Rohauer, supra note 4,
at 642. But see Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484,488,494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 949 (1977); Edmonds v. Stem, 248 F. 897, 888 (2d Cir. 1918).
36. See supra note 17; compare 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909)
(amended 1976) (providing copyright for derivative works).
37. The term "derivative work" was substituted for "new works" to codify the usage
preferred by judges and commentators. Note, Rohauer,supra note 4, at 638 n.2 1. See, e.g.,
Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 343 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1965); Reyher, 387 F. Supp. at 870.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
39. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). For an excellent discussion of the termination right
see Melniker & Melniker, supra note 1; Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the
New Copyright Act: Thorny Problemsfor the Copyright Bar, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (1977).

41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (1988). The contours of the derivative work
exception are unmarked and presently unclear. See Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 649
n.109.
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (1988).
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continued utilization of a derivative work during the renewal term of the
43
underlying copyright secured prior to January 1, 1978.
B.

The Case Law

The conflicting rights of underlying work owners and derivative
work owners regarding the renewal copyright have been a continuing
source of litigation. 44 One of the first cases to address this conflict was
the landmark case FredFisherMusic Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 45 where the
Supreme Court held that the assignment by an author of renewal rights
is valid "against the world," if he is alive at the commencement of the
renewal term.4 6 In Fisher, the author of the song, "When Irish Eyes Are
Smiling," assigned all rights, title, and interest in the song, including the
renewal copyright, to Witmark. 4 7 Subsequently, the author applied for
the renewal copyright and assigned the rights to Fisher. 48 Witmark sued
Fisher for copyright infringement.
In Fisher, the petitioner argued that the reversionary policy of the
renewal term precluded any assignment of renewal interests during the
initial copyright term. 49 The Court acknowledged the legislative intent
to provide authors two chances at exploiting their works, but rejected
the idea that an author could completely avoid any assignments made
during the original copyright period.5 0 The Court observed:
It is one thing to hold that the courts should not make themselves instruments of injustice by lending their aid to enforcement of an agreement ....
It is quite another matter to hold,
as we are asked in this case, that regardless of the circumstances surrounding a particular assignment, no agreements
by
51
authors to assign their renewal interests are binding.
The Court held, as a matter of law, that an author may assign the rights
to the renewal copyright before the expiration of the original
52
copyright.
In a later decision, Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.,53 the
Court expanded the scope of renewal rights. In Miller Music, the coauthor of the song, "Moonlight and Roses," assigned all rights in the
43. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (the 1909 Act renewal
provisions are not addressed).
44. See generallyJasi, supra note 1.
45. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
46. See infra note 53, at 375.
47. Fisher, 318 U.S. at 645.
48. Id. at 646.
49. Id. at 645.
50. Id. at 655-57. The Court reasoned nobody would buy what an author could not
sell, and to prohibit an author from making an effective assignment is not consistent with
providing economic incentive for the author.
51. Id. at 656-57 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 657. While the explicit language of the Copyright Act gives the author an
unqualified right to renew his copyright, the Court did not view this as congressional intent to nullify agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests. See id. at 655-56.
53. 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
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song, including the renewal copyright, to Miller Music.54 The author
died prior to the commencement of the renewal period without a surviving spouse or child. 55 The executor of his estate renewed the copyright
and distributed the renewal rights to the author's legatees. 5 6 The legatees assigned the renewal rights to Daniels. 5 7 Miller Music sued Daniels
for copyright infringement.
The Court held that when an author dies prior to the renewal period his interest in the renewal copyright does not vest, and his statutory
successor is exclusively entitled to the renewal copyright. 58 The Court
reasoned that any purchaser of a contingent interest takes the risk that
the contingency may not occur, and is thereby "deprived of nothing."5 9
Under the Fisher and Miller Music doctrines, then, the critical determination is whether or not the renewal copyright has vested in the author. Where the author survives to the renewal term, the copyright
vests, and his original intention to assign is controlling. If the author
dies before the renewal term commences, however, any interest he purported to assign is terminated because all he held was an expectancy.
It has been suggested that when a derivative work is created with
consent of the underlying work proprietor, "a right of property
[springs] into existence" 60 and the derivative work owner may continue
to use the underlying work, as contained in the derivative work, without
infringing the rights of the underlying renewal copyright. 6 1 In one of
the earlier cases which treated this subject, G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,62 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit effectively
repudiated the "new property doctrine."
In Ricordi, the author of a novel 63 assigned a playwright the rights to
produce a play based on the novel and to retain the title. 64 The author
and the playwright then assigned Ricordi the right to create a derivative
work opera based on the play, but did not include the renewal term.65
After producing the opera, Ricordi wanted to create a motion picture
based on the opera. 6 6 However, the author renewed his copyright in the
54. Id. at 373-74.
55. Id. at 374.
56. Id.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 375. The Court reasoned that this result follows not because the author's
assignment is invalid, but because he only had an expectancy to assign. See id. at n.1.
59. Id. at 378.
60. Edmonds v. Stem, 248 F. 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918). See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). But see Stewart v. Abend, 110
S. Ct. 1750 (1990).
61. The "new property doctrine" was limited to use of the underlying work as incorporated in the derivative work and any remake, sequel, or other exploitation of the underling work was prohibited. For a general discussion of the "new property doctrine" see I
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A];Jasi, supra note 1.
62. 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
63. J. LONG, MADAME BurrERFLY (1897).

64.
65.
viewed
66.

Id. at 470.
Id. at 470. Since the assignment did not include the renewal term, the court
it as limited to the original term of copyright. Id. at 471.
Id. at 471.
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novel and assigned such rights to Paramount Pictures, who also wanted
to make a motion picture, but based upon the novel. 67 Ricordi sued
Paramount for a declaratory judgment.
The court concluded that Ricordi did not have any rights to the
novel during the renewal term and therefore could not make a motion
68
picture version of his opera which necessarily must include the novel.
This holding was contrary to the "new property right" theory, since Ricordi was held to have lost his rights to exploit the underlying work, and
could not exploit his own derivative work. 6 9 Notwithstanding the fact
that Ricordi and subsequent cases70 repudiated the "new property right"
doctrine, the concept was dramatically revived in the case of Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc. 71
In Rohauer, the author of a novel 72 assigned the motion picture
rights in the novel to a production company and agreed to renew the
copyright and thereupon assign the renewal rights to the movie company. 73 The movie company created and copyrighted a motion picture
74
In the
based on the novel and thereafter assigned all rights to Killiam.
meantime, the author of the novel died prior to the renewal period, and
the copyright was renewed by the author's daughter, who assigned all
her "rights, title, and interest" in the novel to Rohauer. 75 Killiam distributed the movie during the renewal term of the novel, and Rohauer
76
sued for copyright infringement.
The Second Circuit held that the continued distribution of the film
77
The
did not infringe the renewal copyright in the underlying work.
78
court acknowledged the Miller Music doctrine, in which a purported
grant of renewal rights is ineffective where the owner does not survive
until the renewal term commences. 79 The court justified its decision,
however, by pointing to the copyright in the derivative work itself and
the express language of the 1909 Act.8 0 Section 7, as amended, provides that a "copyright under the provisions of this title" shall extend to
67. Id.
clear of all rights,
68. Id. at 471-72 ("A copyright renewal creates a new estate ....
interests or licenses granted under the original copyright [citations omitted]."). See Fox
Film Corp. v. Knowles, 274 F. 731, 732 (D.N.Y.), aft'd, 279 F. 1018 (2d. Cir. 1922), rev'don
other grounds, 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);

H.

BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 535 (1944).

69. See I M. NiMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A].
70. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (ownership
of the derivative copyright does not affect the scope of ownership of the underlying copyright); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
71. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). For an excellent discussion of the Rohauer opinion see Note, Rohauer, supra note 4.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
made.
78.
79.
80.

E. HULL, THE SONS OF THE SHIEK (1925).

Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 494. However, new or "second generation" derivative works could not be
Id. at 488.
See supra notes 53, 58-59 and accompanying text.
Miller Music Corp. v. Charles Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487-90. The court distinguished Miller Music and other cases
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"new works." 8 1 The implicit authority was that the "copyright" conferred by section 7 encompasses the entire derivative work, including
underlying works, and therefore continued use is not
the one or more
82
infringement.
In addition, the court placed great emphasis on the policy considerations relating to underlying work owners and derivative work owners:
[Tihe equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of
the derivative copyright. In contrast to the situation where an
assignee or licensee has done nothing more than print, publicize and distribute a copyright story or novel, a person who
with the consent of the author has created an opera or a motion
picture film will often have made contributions literary, musical
83
and economic, as great as or greater than the original author.
Furthermore, the court observed that the derivative work owner "has no
truly effective way of protecting himself against the eventuality of the
author's death before the renewal period" or knowing who the surviving
84
spouse, child, executor, or next of kin will be.
The Rohauer case, decided in 1977, served as a guide to derivative
work owners who continued to use their derivative works during the renewal term of underlying works.8 5 In 1988, this issue was presented to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Abend v. MCA,
Inc.8 6 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Rohauer approach,8 7 and held that
the continued distribution of a derivative work during the renewal term
of the underlying work was infringement where the author died prior to
the renewal term. 88 The holding in Abend v. MCA directly conflicted
with decisions in other circuits and led to the grant of certiorariin Stewart
89
v. Abend.
in that they were concerned only with the reconciliation between a derivative copynght and
the underlying renewal copyright. Id. at 490.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (amended 1976). The court found that the thrust of section
7 was to protect derivative works, and the "force and validity" language regarding the
underlying copyright had no bearing on the right of the derivative work user to continue
using his derivative work during the copyright renewal term of the subsisting work.
Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487-90.
82. But see 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-37, 3-38 (declaring the assumption erroneous).
83. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
84. Id. at 493. The court found support for this policy consideration in the derivative
work exceptions set out in sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act. See supra
note 42.
85. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 183 n.7 (1985) (WhiteJ, dissenting)
(characterizing the holding of Rohauer as the "prevail[ing] view").
86. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 1472-78.
88. Id. at 1478. Although the Ninth Circuit held for the underlying work owner, the
court recognized the substantial investment, efforts and talent of the derivative work
owner, and directed the district court to fashion a remedy accordingly. Id.
89. 110 S.Ct. 1750 (1990).
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STEWART v. ABEND

Facts

Stewart Abend, doing business as Authors Research Company (respondent), brought suit to enjoin continued distribution of the classic
1954 Alfred Hitchcock motion picture, Rear Window 90 (the motion picture), starring James Stewart and Grace Kelly, by MCA, Inc., Universal
Film Exchanges, Inc., James Stewart and the co-trustees of Alfred Hitchcock's estate (petitioner).
In 1945, author Cornell Woolrich agreed to assign the motion picture rights to several of his stories, including one incorporated in the
motion picture at issue,9 1 to a production company (predecessor-in-interest).92 Woolrich also agreed to renew the copyright in the stories at
the appropriate time and to assign the same motion picture rights to the
predecessor-in-interest for the twenty-eight year renewal term provided
by the 1909 Act. 98 In 1953, the predecessor-in-interest assigned the
motion picture rights to petitioner. 94 Rear Window was produced, copyrighted, and distributed by petitioner in 1954.95
In 1968, Woolrich died without a surviving spouse or child and
before he could renew the short story copyright. 9 6 His statutory successor renewed the copyright and assigned the renewal rights to respondent.9 7 In 1982, petitioner renewed the copyright in the motion
picture, and in reliance on the 1977 Rohauer decision, re-released the
film. 9 8 Respondent brought suit for copyright infringement in district
court.
The district court granted summary judgment for petitioner on the
alternative grounds that continued distribution of the film was permitted
by: (1) the Rohauer rule, 9 9 and (2) the "fair use" doctrine.1 0 0 The Ninth
90. Rear Window (Universal Studios 1954).
91. The short story "It Had To Be Murder" was first published in the February 1942
issue of Dime Detective magazine and served as the basis for the 1954 film Rear Window.
92. Id. at 1755. B.G. De Sylva Productions originally obtained the film rights and later
assigned the rights to petitioner's parent, Patron, Inc. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1752.
96. Id. at 1755.
97. Id. at 1756. As executor of the Woolrich estate, Chase Manhattan Bank renewed
the copyright in "'It
Had To Be Murder" pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 24 and assigned the
renewal rights to respondent. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 71, 77-84 and accompanying text.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). The Copyright Revision Act of October 19, 1976, P.L.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2546, codified the fair use doctrine into section 107. The text provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or such or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
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Circuit reversed, 10 1 holding that petitioner's use of the Woolrich story
in its film was not fair use and rejected the reasoning of Rohauer.10 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B.

Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court held that the distribution and publication of
the derivative work (the film Rear Window) by petitioner, during the
copyright renewal term of the underlying work (the short story), infringed upon the rights of the respondent when the author of the underlying work agreed to assign the rights in the renewal term to the
derivative work owner, but died before the commencement of the renewal term.10 3 The Court also held the unauthorized use of the Wool10 4
rich story by petitioner was not fair use.
The first issue before the Court was whether the death of the prior
work's author, before commencement of the renewal period, extinguished the right of the derivative work owner to use the underlying
work. The Court held in the affirmative, reasoning that the renewal provisions of the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts, their legislative history,
and the case law interpreting them established that they were intended
to give the author a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for his
creative efforts, and to provide the author's family or statutory successor
(absent a surviving spouse or child) with a "new estate" if the author
05
died before the renewal term commenced.
The Court next considered whether the right of the underlying
work owner to sue for infringement was extinguished by creation of the
derivative work.' 0 6 The Court held that this right was not extinguished,
and that petitioner's contention was unsupported by the Act and contrary to the axiomatic principle that a person may exploit only such
10 7
copyrighted material that he either owns or is licensed to use.
The third issue was whether the termination provisions of the 1976
Act may, under the facts of this case, prevent the owner of a preexisting
work from enjoining distribution of a derivative work. The Court held
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C. § 107.
101. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. Id.
103. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1760 (1990).
104. Id. at 1768.
105. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1758-60.
106. Petitioners argued that the creation of the "new" derivative work under section 7,
extinguishes any rights the preexisting work owner may have to sue. Id. at 1761.
107. Id. at 1761. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text regarding the scope of a
derivative work.
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that the termination provisions do not effect the underlying work
owner's right to sue for infringement and that the express language of
the termination provision indicates that Congress assumed the underly10 8
ing work owner had such a right.
The fourth issue was whether the holding in Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc. 10 9 controlled. The Court held that the Rohauer theory was
not supported by either the 1909 or 1976 Acts and was not the "bright
line rule," but was instead merely an "interest balancing approach." 1 1 0
The fifth issue was whether the rule announced by the court of appeals would undermine a policy of the Copyright Act to ensure the dissemination of creative works. The Court, exercising judicial restraint,
decided that this argument was better addressed by Congress than the
courts. I I
The final issue was whether the distribution of Rear Window by petitioner was fair use of respondent's underlying copyright. The Court
concluded it was not. 12
Petitioner argued that a derivative work is independent of the underlying work and not subordinate to the rights of the underlying work
owner during the renewal term. 1 3 Petitioner asserted that its theory of
the case was supported by reading together sections 3, 7 and 24 of the
1909 Act and the termination provisions of the 1976 Act. 1 4 The Court
15
rejected this "overarching" interpretation of the Act."
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Court concluded that read
together, the various sections of the 1909 and 1976 Acts actually favored
respondent. The Court observed that the plain language of the relevant
statutory sections supported not only the underlying work owner's right
to the renewal term free of any assignments made by the prior author,"16 but also that the termination exception for derivative works in
the 1976 Act had no effect regarding the renewal rights of the underlying work owner." 17
The Court found ineluctable authority in the case of Miller Music
108. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1762-63.
109. See supra note 71.
110. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1763.
111. Id. at 1763-65.
112. Id. at 1768-69. Fair use has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner
of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." Rosemont
Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009
(1966) (quoting H. BALL, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
See also Annotation, Extent of Doctrine of "Fair Use" Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R. 3d
130 (1969). See generally Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1954); Note,
FairUse: A ControversialTopic in the Latst Revision of Our Copyright Law, 34 U. CIN. L. REv. 73
(1965).
113. 110 S. Ct. at 1758, 1761.
114. Id. at 1761-63.
115. Id. at 1753.
116. Id. at 1759-60.
117. Id. at 1763. Congress specifically declined to apply the derivative works exception
of the new termination provisions retroactively, or otherwise alter renewal rights as to
existing works. See H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 139; Note, Derivative Copynght and
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309

Corp. v. Daniels, Inc.1 18 Following Miller Music, the Court concluded, a
fortiori, that the assignee of a portion of the renewal rights, for example,
the right to create and distribute a derivative work, must also hold
nothing.119
The Court compared Rohauerto other factual simulations and found
the approach set forth in Rohauer to be problematic. 120 It observed that
"while in some cases Rohauer might make some sense in some contexts,
it makes no sense in others."' 12 1 The Court concluded that Rohauer did
122
not announce a rule but merely a balancing approach.
The Court weighed amici 123 and the public interest in having access
to derivative works. 124 Amici argued that owners of underlying works
would be able to retire their copyrights or to make such exorbitant demands for future use that it would be economically impossible to further
distribute derivative works. 12 5 The Court dismissed these arguments as
126
better addressed by Congress than the courts.
Finally, the Court determined that the unauthorized use of respondent's preexisting copyright in petitioner's derivative work was not fair
use. 12 7 It noted that the film neither fell into any of the categories of
fair use enumerated in section 107 nor met any of the nonexclusive cri28
teria that section 107 requires a court to consider.'
2.

Concurring Opinion

Justice White concurred that the result reached in Miller Music required the result reached by the Court. 12 9 He disagreed, however, that
30
the decision in Miller Music was required by the Copyright Act.1
3.

Dissenting Opinion

In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, argued that section 7, by its plain language, creates an independent copyright in the entire derivative work, entitled to
the 1909 Act-New Clarityor Confusion?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 905, 930-31 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Derivative Copyright]; Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 646.
118. 362 U.S. 373 (1960) (assignee of all rights during the renewal term holds nothing
if the assignor dies prior to the renewal term). See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Miller Music decision.
119. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1760.
120. Id. at 1763. The court used the example of a condensed book, where the contribution of the derivative author is little and that of the original author is great. Id.
121. Id. at 1763.
122. Id.
123. Various motion picture companies submitted amicus curiae briefs in support of
petitioner, while the Copyright Register, the American Songwriters Guild and the Committee for Literary Property Studies submitted briefs in support of respondent.
124. The petitioner and supporting amici briefs argued that the court of appeals decision would lead to fewer works reaching the public. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
125. Id. at 1764.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1768-69. See supra notes 100 & 112 regarding the "fair use" doctrine.
128. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1768.
129. Id. at 1769 (White, J., concurring).
130. Id.
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equal treatment with the preexisting work under the renewal and duration provisions of section 24.131 In other words, once the derivative
work obtained copyright, it was entitled to its own two terms of twentyeight year protection without limitation. The dissent argued that the
legislative history supported the contention that a derivative copyright,
made with the consent of the underlying work proprietor, creates a completely independent work entitled to the same monopoly privileges of
13 2
the original work.
Justice Stevens further argued that once consent had been obtained, and the derivative work was created and copyrighted in accord
with that consent, "a right of property springs into existence." 1 33 He
reasoned: "[t]he original copyright may have relatively little value because the creative contribution of the second artist is far more significant
than that of the original contribution," 134 and Congress intended for
such "new works" to receive independent copyright protection.13 5 The
dissent focused on the consent of the original author and argued that
the "agreement to permit use of the underlying material during the renewal term does not violate section 24 because at the moment consent is
given and the derivative work is created and copyrighted, a new right of
property comes into existence independent of the original author's
1 36
copyright estate."
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's implicit endorsement of
Miller Music. 13 7 Justice Stevens distinguished Miller Music by focusing on
the form of the assignment. Where an author merely assigns the right to
copy and vend his work, the reasoning of Miller Music is valid. He asserted, however, that where the author expressly consents to production
of a derivative work under section 7, the copyright on such derivative
38
work gives the proprietor a superior right.1
IV.

COMMENTS

The result in Abend merely reaffirms the axiomatic principle that an
author or his family should have two chances to seek fair remuneration
for his creative efforts. This basic principle of copyright law has been
131. Id. at 1769-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1772-75. "The legislative history confirms that the copyright in derivative
works not only gives the second creative product the monopoly privileges of excluding
others from the uncontested use of the new work, but also allows the creator to publish his
or her own work product." Id. at 1775.
133. Id. at 1775 (quoting Edmonds v. Stem, 248 F. 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918)). See supra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text for the "new property right" doctrine.
134. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1775.
135. Id. "By designating derivative works as 'new works' that are subject to copyright
and accorded the two terms applicable to original works, Congress evinced its intention
the derivative copyright not lapse upon termination of the original author's interest in the
underlying copyright." Id. at 1776.
136. Id. at 1777.
137. Id. at 1778. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miller
Music.
138. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1778. "The possession of a copyright on a properly created
derivative work gives the proprietor rights superior to those of a mere licensee." Id.
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accepted and relied upon since the inception of the 1909 Act. 139 The
140
decision in Abend should have been unanimous.
The dissent trivialized the Court's reliance on the plain reading of
the statute. It creatively argued that the statutory provisions and their
congressional intent were something else. 1 4 ' According to the dissent,

reading section 7 in conjunction with section 24 of the Act gives the
derivative work copyright two full terms of protection in the entire derivative work, when the original work is used with the consent of the author
and when the original work is in the public domain. 14 2 In other words,

the dissent maintains that the derivative copyright extends beyond the
original contribution of the derivative author and includes the underly14 3
ing work itself.

The dissent read into the Act a provision which does not exist, ex-

plicitly or implicitly, in the statutes.144 In addition, its contentions "fly
in the face" of both section 103(b) and the courts' consistent interpretation of the scope of derivative work protection, which explicitly state
that a copyright in a derivative work "extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the pre-ex45
isting material employed in the work."1
139. See, e.g., Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) (an
author's assignment of rights in the renewal copyright is unenforceable as against the au-

thor's executor who obtained the renewal copyright at the author's death); Fox Film Corp.
v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923) (a deceased author's executor is entitled to the renewal
copyright); M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(if the author dies prior to obtaining renewal copyright, his agreement to convey rights in
the renewal copyright is ineffective); L. FROLICH & C. ScHWARTz, THE LAW OF MOTION
PICTURES INCLUDING THE LAW OF THE THEATRE 549 (1918) (an author's agreement to dis-

tribute a motion picture version of his work during the renewal term is worthless if the
author dies prior to renewal); Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 460,

470 (1943) (the renewal term is a highly speculative venture); Chafee, Reflections on Copyright Law: 11, 45 CoLUM. L. REV. 719, 726 (1945) (the 1909 Act provides a veto power for

the surviving relatives in respect to the renewal copyright).
140. Abend has not gone without criticism. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 112 (1967) (the statutory interpretation of the Court may have a "peculiarly
perverse" effect); S. SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO, MOTION
PICTURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER 95 (1956) (may have an "odd and complicated"
effect); Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright-Section 23 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 44 COLUM. L.
REV. 712, 724 (1944) (using the words "an anachronism"); Note, Abend v. MCA, CopyRIGHT L.J. 14, at 16-17 (Feb. 1989) (the Ninth Circuit opinion "does not make sense");
Note, Renewal Rights, A Statutory Anachronism, 10 W. RESERVE L. REV. 263, 272 (1959)
(describing the concept as "anomalous").
141. The dissent reasoned that
[t]he Copyright Act of 1909 elsewhere accords protection to all the writings of an
author ....
Congress would hardly have needed to provide for the copyright of
derivative works, including the detailed provisions on the limit of that copyright,
if it intended only to accord protection to the improvements to an original work
of authorship.
Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1772.
142. Id. at 1772 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. The dissent noted that the early drafts of the 1909 Act determined that the extent
of copyright protection rests "upon the nature of the work as a whole rather than the
original expression contributed by the copyright author." Id. at 1774.
144. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (amended 1976) with 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (the
derivative work and underlying dichotomy is not addressed).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
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Congress, in its legislative wisdom, decided not to tamper with the
renewal system, 146 and instead implemented a termination mechanism. 14 7 This termination scheme did not limit the reversionary interest
held by authors and their successors to the renewal copyright. 148 It is
true that the derivative work exception to the termination provisions is
indicative of Congress' belief in the need for special protection of derivative works. 149 The countervailing and dominant congressional policy,
however, is to protect an author or his statutory successor from unremunerative transfers. 150
The dissent in Abend attempted to sidestep the prevailing policy of
protecting the original work by arguing that the derivative work owner
has "no truly effective way of protecting himself," 15 1 and that the inequity of the situation supports its view that Congress intended the derivative work copyright owner receive independent protection despite the
intrusion upon the renewal copyright owner's rights. 152 This contention merely serves one interest group over another and furthermore implies the existence of a provision in the Copyright Act that it expressly
rejects. The dissent, however, seeks to justify its theory in the Rohauer
doctrine,'15 that a derivative copyright is an independent property inter15 4
est entitled to its own two terms of copyright without limitation.
In Rohauer, the central argument, as pointed out by the dissent, was
the inequity in denying a derivative work owner the rewards of his investment. 15 5 The legislature recognized this relevant policy considera1979); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976); Reyher v.
Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976).
146. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED

STATES COPYRIGHT LAw 53, 57 (Comm. Print 1961); Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 658.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text regarding the termination right.
148. The termination provision of the 1976 Act evidenced a compromise between authors, movie companies, and the Register of Copyrights. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1967). See also Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 13
COPYRIGHT 187, 188-89 (1977); Note, Derivative Copyright, supra note 117, at 930-31; Note,
Rohauer, supra note 4, at 647.
149. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975). An important limitation on
the rights of a copyright owner under a terminated grant is specified in section 203(b)(1).
This clause provides that notwithstanding a termination, a derivative work prepared earlier may continue to be utilized under the conditions of the terminated grant; the clause
adds, however, that this privilege is not broad enough to permit the preparation of other
derivative works. Id.
150. See supra notes 13, 15-16 and accompanying text.
151. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1778 at n.22 (1990) (quoting Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc.. 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (citing Bricker, Renewal
and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 33 (1955))).
152. "Unless § 24 is to overwhelm § 7, the consent of the original author must be given
effect whether or not it intrudes into the renewal term of the original copyright." Abend,
110 S. Ct. at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See supra notes 71, 77-82 and accompanying text.
154. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1772.
155. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1778 n.22. "[A] person who with the consent of the author
has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have made contributions literary,
musical, and economic, as great as or greater than the original author." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493).
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tion by providing derivative works with their own two terms of
copyright. 1 5 6 This argument not only begs the question why have a renewal term, but also flatly ignores section 103 which expressly states
that the derivative copyright cannot include the underlying copyright. 15 7 Rohauer has been extensively criticized in past years 158 and
under materially identical facts the Supreme Court has rejected its
reasoning! 15 9
Undeniably the dissent makes a point; neither the 1909 Act nor the
1 60
1976 Act effectively treat the derivative work/renewal term scenario.
This congressional oversight does not justify distortion of the Copyright
Act, however. Until Congress amends the Act to specifically treat this
issue, courts must construe the Act as it is written.
One commentator has suggested a statutory amendment in which
royalties automatically accrue to the underlying work owner when the
derivative work is exploited during the renewal term of the underlying
work.16 1 While this suggestion is a step in the right direction, it is also
problematic. It assumes that the renewal copyright owner will always
seek monetary compensation. For example, the renewal copyright
owner who, for his own reasons, wishes to retire his copyright, will be
precluded from doing so by the continued use of the derivative work.
At first glance, the reversionary interest of the renewal term seems
to cut against traditional notions of free enterprise, freedom of contract
and free alienability of property. In the unique case of the renewal copyright, however, it actually "thickens the plot" and furthers such traditional notions by providing additional opportunities to negotiate and
assume risks. Additionally, the upshot of Abend may actually be more
16 2
favorable to the derivative work owner than Rohauer.
Under Rohauer, the renewal of the derivative work was also, pro tanto,
a renewal of the original work. When a copyright is owned jointly by
several individuals, renewal by one such individual suffices to renew the
156. "By designating derivative works as 'new works'.., and accordfing] the two terms
applicable to original works, Congress evinced its intention that the derivative copyright
not lapse upon termination of the original author's interest in the underlying copyright."
Id. at 1776.
157. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (amended 1976)
(the sections are diametrically opposed).
158. Professor Nimmer has stated that the Rohauer decision is "plainly wrong." 1 M.
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-40. SeeJasi, supra note 44, at 791;
Mimms, Jr., Reversion and Derivative Works Under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 25
N.Y.L. SCM. L. REV. 595, 608-09 (1980); Note, Derivative Copyright, supra note 117, at 919-

21.
159. See Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1763 (concluding that neither the 1909 Act nor the 1976
Act provides support for the theory in Rohauer).
160. The 1976 Act does not specifically address the issues raised by the continued utilization of a derivative work during the renewal term of the underlying copyright. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (the 1976 Act does not specifically
address the issues raised by the continued utilization of a derivative work during the renewal term of the underlying copyright).
161. See Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 659-62.
162. See I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-49.
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interest of all. 1 63 Therefore, the heirs, as fellow owners, do not lose
their rights in the underlying work by failing to renew the copyright and
the studio is prevented from producing a remake, sequel, or other exploitation of the underlying work. 164 Under Abend, by contrast, the heirs
lose any rights they have in the underlying work from failure to renew,
and the motion picture studio is free to exploit the underlying work as it
pleases. 165
The decision in Abend is a very principled and workable decision
which flows inexorably from the Copyright Act. Any potential inequity
that may arise from the use of a derivative work during the renewal term
of the underlying work is a matter better left to Congress than to the
courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The confusion surrounding the renewal copyright and the derivative work copyright will, in time, subside. The 1976 Act expressly provides an exception for derivative works. 1 66 For works copyrighted prior
to January 1, 1978, however, the exclusive right to the renewal term remains. 167 Until the year 2005,168 absent legislative amendment, courts
will continue to apply the renewal system of the 1909 Act together with
the termination scheme of the 1976 Act.
The Supreme Court has decided that the rights of the renewal copyright owner are superior to the rights of the derivative work copyright
owner. 16 9 Thus, where the author of the underlying copyright dies
prior to the commencement of the renewal term, the derivative work
owner no longer has any right to exploit the underlying work. In light of
this decision, the motion picture industry, as well as other users of derivative works, will be well advised to secure the consent of the current renewal copyright owner, or risk possible exposure to infringement suits,
declaratory actions, injunctions, or other forms of liability.
Clark L. McCutchen

NIMMER, supra note 18, § 9.05[E], at 9-64, 9-65.
1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-48, 3-49.

163. 2 M. NIMMER & D.
164.

165. The public is also free to exploit the underlying copyright because the failure to
renew causes the copyright to fall into the public domain. Id.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
167. Id. § 304(a) (preserving the 1909 Act's two-tier renewal system for all works that
were in their initial copyright term as of January 1, 1978).
168. The ultimate owner of the renewal copyright will not be known until twenty-eight
years after commencement of the initial copyright which potentially is January 1, 2005.
169. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990). This is true only if the author dies prior
to the renewal term, otherwise his original intentions to assign are controlling. See Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).

